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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                     
No. 08-2772
                    
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JOHN J. POLTONOWICZ,
Appellant
                    
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 2-07-cr-00052-1)
District Judge: Hon. James T. Giles
                    
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 6, 2009
BEFORE: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: December 2, 2009)
                    
OPINION
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge
John J. Poltonowicz, pro se, appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence
following his trial conviction for one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, twelve counts of aiding, assisting, and counseling the filing
2of false tax returns in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2), four counts of mail fraud in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, three counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343,
five counts of making false statements on loan applications in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1014, and two counts of making false statements to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”)
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.  We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Poltonowicz began his career with the IRS as an analyst in its Criminal
Investigation Division.  In 1992, he left the IRS and began operating a tax preparation
business.  Over time his business expanded to include additional offices and he hired
additional tax preparers.
By 2003, the IRS began to suspect fraud and sent an undercover agent to his office
with a recording device.  During the course of the taped conversation, Poltonowicz
informed the agent that he would include business expenses in her return, even though she
repeatedly told him that she had no business expenses.  Although the agent never
mentioned charitable contributions, and provided him with no evidence whatsoever of any
such contributions, he included $2,190 in cash contributions to charity and $495 in non-
cash contributions to charity on the agent’s return.  As a result, the agent’s tax return
showed that she was entitled to a $12 refund, instead of reflecting that she owed $1,012 in
additional taxes.  Subsequently, the agent requested a meeting with Poltonowicz to
discuss a letter she received from the IRS informing her that she would be audited. 
3Again, the agent wore a recording device.  He admitted to the preparation of a false tax
return and that he included the false deductions to save her from paying additional taxes
(as he operated under the assumption that she would not be audited).  He reassured her
that she would not get in trouble for the fraudulent return.
Poltonowicz agreed to plead guilty to one count of filing false tax returns and the
IRS revoked his ability to file electronic tax returns.  Thereafter, he formed Matrix Tax
Service, Inc. (“Matrix”) in the name of June M. McMackin, his long-time roommate and
housekeeper.  He filed an account with the IRS under her name to again begin filing
electronic tax returns.  Prior to trial, he moved, pro se, to suppress the evidence obtained
during searches of his home and Matrix’s offices.  Poltonowicz appeared at the
suppression hearing pro se with the assistance of an attorney serving as a legal advisor. 
He testified that he was not the owner of Matrix, that Ms. McMackin owned Matrix, and
that she had interviewed and hired him.  The district court denied his motion.
At trial, several former employees testified that Poltonowicz instructed them to
claim nonexistent employee business expenses, to overstate charitable contributions, and
to understate income.  Additionally, these witnesses testified that they observed him
prepare false tax returns in this manner on numerous occasions.  Numerous clients
testified about their fraudulent tax returns.  Some of these clients were suspicious of the
fictitious charitable contributions, but Poltonowicz reassured them that those deductions
were standard and would not trigger an audit.   Several of these clients had not realized
  The government later amended the PSR to reflect an estimated tax loss of $419,1
853.20.
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that they had submitted fraudulent tax returns until audited by the IRS. 
The government also presented evidence of his affinity for overstating income
when beneficial.  He obtained three mortgages for his home and a lease for an automobile
by providing his creditors with W-2 tax forms that overstated his income.  He provided
W-2s falsified in the same manner for his father and certain clients to assist them in
obtaining loans.  In each of these instances, the W-2s overstated income and were not the
W-2s actually filed with the IRS for that particular year.
The jury convicted Poltonowicz of all of the charges except for two counts of
making false statements to obtain a loan in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.  The parties
then prepared for sentencing, for which he retained counsel.  The pre-sentence
investigation report (“PSR”) estimated the tax loss at $408, 275.   Poltonowicz moved for1
an order compelling the government to produce the documents on which it relied.  In
particular, he asserted that the government was required to support its estimated tax loss
with tax returns, memoranda of interviews of clients, and audit reports and demanded
production of these documents.  The government countered that under the Sentencing
Guidelines, it was permitted to support its estimate with the 200 audited tax returns
presented at the trial, but that nonetheless, he had all of the requested documents one year
prior to his trial.  
5The district court conducted a sentencing hearing, at which Poltonowicz appeared
with counsel.  The government offered testimony as to its methodology in calculating the
tax loss.  It restricted the calculations to tax returns that were personally prepared by
Poltonowicz as opposed to any of the returns prepared by his employees (despite evidence
that he encouraged and sometimes required employees to include false deductions).  Of
that subset of tax returns, the government included only those that contained one of the
methods of falsifying tax returns established at trial, such as fictitious cash and non-cash
charitable contributions, employee non-reimbursed expenses, and claims of eligibility for
the earned income tax credit.  The government filtered that subset to include two types of
returns: (1) returns for which the IRS had conducted an audit and had subsequently
assessed the taxpayer with additional tax liability based on the tax payer’s inability to
substantiate their return, or (2) returns for taxpayers interviewed, who confirmed that they
did not provide any evidence of the deductions at issue or request that they be included. 
The estimate of $419,853.20, in the manner calculated, was actually under inclusive.
Poltonowicz argued that the court should limit the calculation to those tax returns
of former clients whom the government interviewed, which would result in a tax loss of
$80,000 to $200,000.  He argued that it was improper for the government to include tax
returns based solely on audits as some of those fictitious deductions might have been at
the direction of his clients.
The District Court credited the government’s testimony and found a total tax loss
  The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have2
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
  We review factual findings, such as the calculation of a tax loss attributable to a3
defendant’s criminal activity, for clear error.  See United States v. Roman, 121 F.3d 136,
140 (3d Cir. 1997).  
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in excess of $400,000.  The District Court determined that enhancements for obstruction
of justice and the leadership role were appropriate.  It sentenced Poltonowicz to forty-
eight months of imprisonment, well below the guidelines range, and imposed a $10,000
fine, a $2,700 special assessment, and $400,000 in restitution.      
II. DISCUSSION2
Poltonowicz asserts that the District Court erred as it:  (1) miscalculated the tax
loss, (2) relied on fraudulent tax data submitted by the government in support of its
sentencing recommendation, (3) improperly assessed a two-level enhancement for
obstruction of justice, (4) improperly assessed a four-level enhancement for being the
leader of criminal activity, and (5) improperly imposed restitution in the amount of
$400,000.
A. Calculation of Tax Loss3
“For tax offenses, a defendant’s base offense level is determined by the tax loss.” 
United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 355 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual §§ 2T1.1(a)(1), 2T1.9).  “In determining the total tax loss attributable
to the offense . . . all conduct violating the tax laws should be considered as part of the
same course of conduct or common scheme or plan unless the evidence demonstrates that
7the conduct is clearly unrelated.”  U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1 cmt. n.2. 
Further, “[a] sentencing court is permitted to make ‘a reasonable estimate based on the
available facts’ where the exact amount of tax loss may be uncertain.”  Gricco, 277 F.3d
at 356; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2T1.1 cmt. n.1 (noting that when
“the amount of the tax loss may be uncertain; the guidelines contemplate that the court
will simply make a reasonable estimate based on the available facts”). 
Poltonowicz contends that the District Court erred in finding that the tax loss
exceeded $400,000.  At the sentencing hearing, he argued that the evidence supported a
tax loss of $80,000 to $200,000.  For the first time, he now asserts on appeal that the
evidence supports a tax loss of $17,960.  He faults the District Court for relying on
extrapolated data and asserts that the District Court should have excluded losses for tax
payers whom the government did not interview.  
The district court relied on evidence presented at trial and the sentencing hearing to
reach its conclusion.  The government established the modus operandi—preparing tax
returns with fictitious data for charitable contributions, employee non-reimbursed
expenses, and claims of eligibility under the earned income tax credit.  It did not err in
including tax returns in the tax loss calculation which had been subject to and had failed
an audit by the IRS, even if the government did not interview the tax payer.  Poltonowicz
is on audiotape informing a potential client that he knew exactly how to claim fictitious
deductions without getting caught.  Indeed, the evidence suggests a much larger tax loss. 
8He personally prepared 20,000 to 25,000 tax returns, yet the government calculated its tax
loss based on just 225 of those returns.  One former employee testified that at least 25% of
the returns Poltonowicz filed contained fictitious deductions.  The government excluded
from its calculation any returns that were prepared by employees, even though several
employees testified that he directed them to add fictitious deductions to the returns they
filed.  On average, 50-54% of returns claim charitable contributions; whereas, 98% of
Poltonowicz’s clients claimed such deductions.  Notably, his clients uniformly claimed to
donate in one of three precise amounts:  $490, $495, and $500.
Poltonowicz also challenges the government’s calculation of additional losses by
comparing his average claims for certain deductions, such as the charitable deduction,
with that of the national average.  He asserts that it was improper to compare his clients to
the national average because his clients were not average tax payers; rather, his clients
consisted of blue-collar, religious, conservative tax payers who were far more likely to
make charitable contributions than the average tax payer.  He makes a similar argument
with respect to the government’s comparative information on employee non-reimbursed
expenses.  These arguments lack merit.  The District Court did not rely on the
government’s comparative data in reaching its conclusion that the tax loss exceeded
$400,000.  The District Court based its conclusion on the audited returns and mentioned
the additional statistical evidence in noting that the government’s calculation was
extremely conservative.  There is no error with a District Court’s consideration of
  We review a district court’s ruling on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of4
discretion.  See United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003).  
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statistical evidence in a case involving upwards of 20,000 tax returns.
The government presented a conservative tax loss calculation.  This estimate was
reasonable given the evidence before the District Court.  We reject the challenge to the
tax loss calculation. 
B. Prosecutorial Misconduct4
Poltonowicz asserts that the government supported its calculation with several
returns that it knew were inaccurate to reach the threshold tax loss amount of $400,000. 
This contention lacks merit.  The government excluded the returns in question and still
reached a tax loss of $419,853.20.  Poltonowicz presented no evidence of any inaccurate
tax returns, nor did he present any evidence that would negate his liability for the tax
losses identified by the government.  We reject Poltonowicz’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct.  
C. Obstruction of Justice Finding
Poltonowicz asserts that the District Court erred in assessing a two-level
enhancement under § 3C1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, for obstruction of
justice related to his testimony at the suppression hearing regarding his interest in Matrix. 
He asserts that there was nothing false about his testimony.  The record belies this
assertion. 
10
D. Leader of Criminal Activity
Under § 3B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines, courts may increase a defendant’s
offense level by four levels “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal
activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.”  U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1.  Poltonowicz exerted control over McMackin
and others to further his criminal scheme.  Two former employees testified that they
prepared tax returns containing fictitious deductions at his direction.  We reject the
challenge to this enhancement.  
E. Restitution
Poltonowicz contends that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution
as convictions for tax fraud are excepted from those crimes for which restitution can be
ordered.  There is no legal authority for this claim.  The district court had authority to
impose restitution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d), 3563(b)(2). 
III. CONCLUSION  
We will affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence of June 12, 2008.
